Seed-stage B2B SaaS startup
Sample for a fictional organisation · 2,727 words[Company] Incident Response Plan
- Version: 1.0
- Owner: Founder/CTO
- Approved by: Chief Executive Officer
- Effective date: [Effective date]
- Next review date: [Review date]
1. Purpose
This plan tells everyone at [Company] what to do when something goes wrong with a system, an account, or data that [Company] is trusted to protect. It sets out how to report a suspected problem, how the company decides how serious it is, who takes charge, and what steps to follow to contain and fix it. Because [Company] is a small, fully remote team, this plan is written to be usable by anyone under pressure, not just by a security specialist.
This plan supports [Company]'s information security policy and its work toward a SOC 2 report. It also helps [Company] meet its legal and contractual duties to customers, employees, and regulators when a security incident affects personal information or customer systems. Every employee and contractor must read this plan and know how to report a concern.
2. Scope
This plan applies to every employee and contractor of [Company], and to every system, account, and dataset the company uses or manages, including its cloud infrastructure on AWS, its Google Workspace environment, and its source code and repositories on GitHub. It covers security incidents affecting [Company]'s own systems as well as incidents that affect customer data processed by [Company] on behalf of its customers.
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[Company] Incident Response Plan
- Version: 1.0
- Owner: Founder/CTO
- Approved by: Chief Executive Officer
- Effective date: [Effective date]
- Next review date: [Review date]
1. Purpose
This plan tells everyone at [Company] what to do when something goes wrong with a system, an account, or data that [Company] is trusted to protect. It sets out how to report a suspected problem, how the company decides how serious it is, who takes charge, and what steps to follow to contain and fix it. Because [Company] is a small, fully remote team, this plan is written to be usable by anyone under pressure, not just by a security specialist.
This plan supports [Company]'s information security policy and its work toward a SOC 2 report. It also helps [Company] meet its legal and contractual duties to customers, employees, and regulators when a security incident affects personal information or customer systems. Every employee and contractor must read this plan and know how to report a concern.
2. Scope
This plan applies to every employee and contractor of [Company], and to every system, account, and dataset the company uses or manages, including its cloud infrastructure on AWS, its Google Workspace environment, and its source code and repositories on GitHub. It covers security incidents affecting [Company]'s own systems as well as incidents that affect customer data processed by [Company] on behalf of its customers.
3. Incident and Event Definitions
An "event" is anything unusual that is noticed on a system, account, or network; most events are harmless or turn out to have an ordinary explanation. An "incident" is an event that has actually or potentially compromised the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of [Company]'s systems or data, and that requires a response under this plan.
- Events (not automatically incidents):
- A single failed login attempt.
- An automated vulnerability scan hitting a public endpoint.
- A brief, unexplained service slowdown that resolves on its own.
- Incidents:
- Unauthorized access to a customer's data or account.
- A lost or stolen laptop or phone that had access to company systems.
- Malware or ransomware found on a company device or cloud resource.
- A phishing email that led an employee to enter their credentials.
- Suspicious activity in AWS, Google Workspace, or GitHub, such as unrecognized logins, unexpected changes to permissions, or unauthorized code commits.
- Accidental disclosure of personal information to the wrong recipient.
4. Incident Reporting
Anyone who notices a suspected incident, or anything that looks like one, must report it immediately using the team chat tool, in a dedicated incident channel if one exists, or by direct message to the Founder/CTO if not. If the team chat tool is unavailable or may itself be compromised, the report must be made by phone call to the Founder/CTO or the backup contact listed in Appendix A. Reports must never wait for confirmation that something is actually wrong; it is always better to raise a suspicion early than to wait.
Reporting a suspected incident that turns out to be a false alarm carries no penalty. [Company] wants employees to report early and often, and treats every report seriously until it is shown not to be an incident. Delaying a report because of uncertainty, or because the employee is worried about being blamed, is the outcome this plan is designed to prevent.
5. Severity Levels
[Company] assigns every confirmed incident one of the following severity levels, which determines how quickly it must be worked and who must be informed.
| Level | Description | Examples | Response target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | Confirmed unauthorized access to customer data, production systems down, or an active attacker in company systems | Data breach affecting customer PII, ransomware on a production system | Within 1 business hour |
| High | Likely compromise of an account or system, not yet confirmed as data loss | Compromised employee credentials, suspicious admin activity in AWS or GitHub | Within 4 business hours |
| Medium | Contained or limited-impact issue that still needs prompt attention | Phishing attempt that did not lead to access, misconfigured access control found before misuse | Within 1 business day |
| Low | Minor issue with no evidence of impact | Isolated failed login attempts, a policy violation with no data exposure | Within 3 business days |
These targets apply during [Company]'s normal business hours. Outside business hours, [Company] does not commit to a fixed response time; anyone who believes an incident is urgent must call the Founder/CTO or backup contact directly by phone rather than waiting for a chat message to be seen.
6. Escalation and Internal Reporting
Every report of a suspected incident is escalated to the Founder/CTO, who acts as Incident Commander unless otherwise stated in Section 10. If the Founder/CTO is unavailable, or is themselves the subject of the suspected incident (for example, their account appears compromised), the report must be escalated to the backup contact named in Appendix A, who may be another team member or the outside adviser [External IT/security provider, if any].
Once an incident is confirmed, the Incident Commander is responsible for keeping the rest of the team informed, deciding who else needs to be involved, and communicating with the CEO and, where relevant, with affected customers. Because [Company] is a small team, most incidents are handled by two or three people at most, but the Incident Commander must never handle a Critical incident alone without informing at least one other team member.
7. Incident Documentation
Every confirmed incident must be documented using the Incident Collection Form in Appendix B, starting as soon as the incident is confirmed and updated as the response progresses. Documentation must capture what was known and when, what actions were taken, and what decisions were made, including decisions not to notify a customer or regulator and the reasoning behind them.
[Company] retains incident records for 3 years from the date the incident is closed, to support audits, customer questions, and its own learning from past incidents. Records must be stored in a location accessible to the Incident Commander and backup contact even if the primary chat or email account is unavailable, such as a shared drive outside the compromised account.
8. Incident Response Process
8.1 Summary
[Company]'s incident response follows five phases: identifying and confirming what has happened, containing it to stop further harm, removing the cause, restoring normal operation, and reviewing what happened afterward. Notification obligations to customers, regulators, or individuals must be assessed during containment, not left until the incident is fully resolved, because legal and contractual notification clocks often start running very early.
8.2 Detailed Process
Phase 1: Identification
- Confirm whether the reported event is a genuine incident and assign it a severity level using Section 5.
- Record the time of detection, the reporter, and initial details in the Incident Collection Form (Appendix B).
- Notify the Incident Commander if not already involved.
- Preserve evidence where possible, such as logs in AWS, Google Workspace admin logs, or GitHub audit logs, without altering the affected system.
Phase 2: Containment
- Take immediate steps to stop the incident from spreading or worsening, such as disabling a compromised account, revoking API keys, or isolating an affected system.
- Assess whether the incident affects customer data, employee data, or other personal information, and whether it triggers a legal or contractual notification duty under Section 9.3. This assessment must happen now, not after the incident is resolved.
- Inform the CEO of any incident rated High or Critical.
- Keep a record of every containment action taken and the time it was taken.
Phase 3: Eradication
- Identify and remove the root cause, such as malware, a compromised credential, or a misconfigured permission.
- Patch or reconfigure the affected system to close the gap that allowed the incident.
- Confirm, as far as reasonably possible, that no other systems or accounts were affected in the same way.
Phase 4: Recovery
- Restore affected systems and data from a known-good state, verifying integrity before returning them to normal use.
- Monitor the restored system for signs of recurring or related activity.
- Confirm with the Incident Commander that the incident is resolved before formally closing it.
Phase 5: Post-Incident Review
- Hold an incident response meeting within 5 business days of closing a Medium, High, or Critical incident, using the agenda in Section 8.3.
- Update the Incident Collection Form with the final outcome, root cause, and any notifications made.
- Identify and assign any follow-up actions needed to prevent recurrence.
- Update this plan or related security controls if the review shows a gap.
8.3 Incident Response Meeting Agenda
- What happened and when it was detected.
- What actions were taken and by whom.
- Whether the response met the targets in Section 5.
- Whether any notification duty applied and how it was handled.
- What worked well and what did not.
- Follow-up actions, owners, and target dates.
9. Special Considerations
9.1 Internal Issues
Where the suspected cause of an incident is an employee or contractor, or where the Founder/CTO or another response team member is the subject of the incident, the person affected must be excluded from leading or containing that incident. In that case, the backup contact named in Appendix A takes over as Incident Commander until the matter is resolved.
9.2 Compromised Communications
If the team chat tool or Google Workspace account normally used to run the incident response may itself be compromised, the response team must switch to phone calls as the fallback channel, since phone contact does not depend on the same accounts or provider. Contact numbers for this purpose must be kept up to date in Appendix A and stored somewhere accessible outside the primary accounts.
9.3 External Communications and Breach Reporting
Where [Company] processes personal data on behalf of a customer, its first duty is normally to notify that customer, who then decides whether to notify regulators or individuals; the applicable contract usually sets a notification deadline, and it is often shorter than the law requires, so the contract must always be checked. Where [Company] decides how the data is used, such as data about its own employees or contacts it has collected directly, it must notify affected individuals and, where required, regulators itself.
- Notification to individuals whose personal information was likely accessed or acquired without authorization is generally required under the data breach notification law of the individual's state of residence; these laws differ on both the trigger and the time allowed, so the applicable state's law must be checked for each affected individual.
- Notification to a state attorney general or other regulator is required only under some states' laws, typically once the number of affected residents passes a threshold set by that state; check whether the state's law requires it.
- Where a customer contract sets its own notification deadline for incidents affecting that customer's data, that deadline must be followed even if it is shorter than what the law requires.
- Where the trigger or deadline is unclear, [Company] must notify within the period the law or contract requires and confirm the exact trigger and deadline with [Legal counsel / outside adviser placeholder] before the notification is sent.
9.4 Mitigation and Remediation
Once an incident is contained, [Company] must take reasonable steps to reduce the chance of recurrence, such as rotating credentials, tightening access controls in AWS or GitHub, or adding monitoring for the type of activity seen. Remediation actions must be tracked to completion and reviewed at the post-incident meeting described in Section 8.3.
9.5 Cooperation with Customers, Data Controllers and Authorities
[Company] must cooperate fully and promptly with any customer, data controller, or authority investigating an incident that affects them, including providing timely and accurate information about what happened, what data was affected, and what steps have been taken. Where a customer acts as the data controller and [Company] processes data on its behalf, [Company] must follow that customer's reasonable instructions about further notification once the customer has been informed under Section 9.3.
10. Response Team Members
| Role | Responsibilities |
|---|---|
| Incident Commander (Founder/CTO) | Leads the response, assigns severity, decides on containment actions, and approves external communications |
| Backup Incident Commander | [Backup team member or outside security provider] — takes over when the Founder/CTO is unavailable or is the subject of the incident |
| Technical Responder | Investigates and carries out containment, eradication, and recovery actions in AWS, Google Workspace, and GitHub |
| Communications Lead | Drafts and sends customer and, where needed, regulator notifications; may be the same person as the Incident Commander |
| External Legal Counsel | [Outside legal adviser placeholder] — advises on notification duties and reviews communications before they are sent |
| All Employees and Contractors | Report suspected incidents immediately and cooperate with the response team as requested |
11. Testing and Review
[Company] runs a tabletop exercise at least once a year, walking through a realistic incident scenario with the response team to check that this plan works in practice. This plan is reviewed at least annually, and after any incident rated High or Critical, or after any material change to [Company]'s systems, tools, or team.
12. Management Commitment
[Company]'s leadership is committed to resourcing incident response appropriately for the size of the company, including making time available for testing, keeping this plan current, and ensuring that any incident is handled without regard to who caused it or how it looks. The CEO must be informed of every High or Critical incident and must support the response team in following this plan.
13. Exceptions
Any exception to this plan, such as skipping a documentation step during an active Critical incident to prioritize containment, must be noted in the Incident Collection Form and reviewed at the post-incident meeting.
14. Violations & Enforcement
Failure to report a suspected incident, or interference with an incident response, is treated as a serious matter and may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment or contract. This plan does not penalize good-faith reports that turn out to be false alarms.
15. Appendix A: Contact Information Template
| Role | Name | Primary contact | Backup contact | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Incident Commander | [Name] | [Phone number] | [Backup phone number] | [Founder/CTO] |
| Backup Incident Commander | [Name] | [Phone number] | [Backup phone number] | [Outside security provider, if any] |
| CEO | [Name] | [Phone number] | [Email address] | Informed of all High/Critical incidents |
| External Legal Counsel | [Firm/individual name] | [Phone number] | [Email address] | Advises on notification duties |
| Cloud Provider Support (AWS) | N/A | [Support contact/account ID] | ||
| Workspace Provider Support (Google Workspace) | N/A | [Support contact/account ID] | ||
| Key Customer Contacts | [Customer name] | [Contact name/email] | Update as customer contracts require |
16. Appendix B: Incident Collection Form Template
- Date and time the incident was detected
- Name of the person reporting the incident
- Description of what was observed
- Systems, accounts, or data believed to be affected
- Severity level assigned and date/time assigned
- Containment actions taken and time taken
- Whether a notification duty was assessed, and the outcome of that assessment
- Notifications sent (to whom, when, and by what method)
- Root cause identified
- Eradication and recovery actions taken
- Date and time the incident was closed
- Follow-up actions, owners, and target dates
- Attendees and summary of the post-incident review meeting
Disclaimer
This document is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. It is provided "as is", without warranty of any kind, express or implied, and no liability is accepted for any loss or damage arising from its use. It is used at your own discretion. Review it with a qualified adviser before adopting it.